

What's Going On Behind The CIA's Secret

CIA: THE INSIDE STORY
by Andrew Tully (William Morrow & Company \$4.50)

OUR NEED for national security in a troubled world makes espionage a vital governmental responsibility. We must know the secret plans of enemies as well as private thoughts of allies. We must spot the seeds of trouble before they sprout to catastrophe. To fail is to risk destruction.

Yet the idea of a super-agency as an essential part of our government structure is repugnant to most Americans. The existence of a shadowy apparatus that may involve the country to the point of undeclared war, yet is accountable to no one save the President and can hide its budget even from Congress which appropriates the money, seems to run contrary to our democracy.

THIS IS the dilemma tackled by Andrew Tully, a highly-regarded Washington newspaperman. His book, "CIA: The Inside Story," was controversial before it was off the presses. Within hours of publication its accuracy was questioned by former CIA Director Allen W. Dulles who

called it "a collection of lies." Although Mr. Tully is not a member of the "department of dirty tricks" (as one to whom the author acknowledged a debt for helping with his research (along with such as White House Press Secretary Pierre Salinger and Senate Majority Leader Mike Mansfield) the former CIA boss could scarcely publicly endorse the finished product. In the nature of spying CIA can neither boast of victory nor admit error. Its response to praise or blame must invariably be: No comment.

Mr. Tully goes to the heart of the matter when he questions whether such an agency, being secret and not publicly accountable, can separate its fact-gathering function from policy making, and involve the national interest without being subject to traditional checks and balances.

HE ASSERTS that CIA has on occasion involved the nation. He contends that in the recent controversial case of the generals' revolt in Algeria, "there is every reason to believe that some irresponsible CIA men went too far." He alleges other instances of faulty judgment in world trouble spots.



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"CIA has a noble end in view — the defeat of the international Communist conspiracy," he says. "But with such a goal, the nagging question has always been whether the CIA could keep its intelligence impartial, that is, whether it could restrain itself from reporting dangerous conclusions merely because these conclusions coincided with the urgent necessity of battling communism."

The author's field is broad, covering CIA activity during crises in Japan, Korea, Turkey, the new Africa, Latin America and even, in one colorful episode, in the Kremlin itself. The Cuban chapter throws no new light on this incredible, oft-told story. Though CIA, there again showed overzealousness and errors of judgment, the ultimate failure was not of its fashioning, Mr. Tully declares.

The fact remains, says the

author, that there is no way in the history of any nation that a government has been able to intelligence carefully gathered and evaluated. It is as dependable as modern methods and dogged, painstaking toil can make it. Its only weakness—an Achilles' heel of considerable infirmity in some cases — is the human element that goes into the evaluation."

WHAT OF the future? CIA, or something like it, will be part of our apparatus of survival for the foreseeable future. Under a new director its controls have been tightened and "another Cuba presumably cannot happen."

Our stance toward Cuba is hotly debated. Some in Washington argue for use of our military might, for "the world respects power." Others, notably Sen. Fulbright, the Foreign Relations Committee chairman, hold that "a nation dedicated to morality and the rule of law cannot dispatch its soldiers . . . to overthrow a foreign government but may — in accordance with general international practice — give secret help to such an attempt by nationalists of the country in question."

The CIA's role, regardless of who wins this argument,